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on them by other motorists.
Background
Clifford and Elizabeth Henry
("the Henrys") held a Transameri-
ca Insurance Co. ("Transamerica")
automobile insurance policy. This
policy contained a clause which
excluded liability coverage for
physical injury to any person relat-
ed to the insured by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption, if that person
lived with the insured at the time
of the loss.
Amy Anderson ("Anderson")
drove the Henrys' automobile with
permission from the Henrys. The
Transamerica policy covered the
automobile, in which the Henrys'
son, Michael, was a passenger. The
Henrys' car collided with a truck;
Michael was seriously injured in
the collision. The Henrys sued the
owner of the truck, the operator of
the truck, and Anderson.
The court dismissed Anderson's
insurer from the case after it paid
Michael the policy limit under
Anderson's policy. Anderson then
claimed coverage under the Hen-
rys' policy and asked Transamerica
to defend her in the Henrys' suit
and to pay any settlement or judg-
ment resulting from the suit. Tran-
samerica claimed that it was not
required to provide liability cover-
age to Anderson for Michael's inju-
ries because of the applicability of
the household exclusion clause.
Anderson responded that the
household exclusion clause was
void as against the Indiana public
policy of guaranteeing compensa-
tion to all accident victims, accord-
ing to § 9-1-4-3.5. Ind. Code §
9-1-4-3.5. (West Supp. 1990).
Procedural History
Transamerica filed an action for
declaratory judgment in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, re-
questing a determination of wheth-
er it was required to defend or to
indemnify Anderson on the Hen-
rys' claim. The district court decid-
ed, as a matter of law, that Transa-
merica was not required to provide
liability insurance to Anderson for
Michael's injuries and granted
summary judgment for Transa-
merica. Anderson appealed to the
Seventh Circuit which deferred
judgment to the Indiana Supreme
Court because no clear controlling
precedent resolved the case. The
court of appeals refused to predict
how the Indiana courts would de-
cide the issue and instead certified
two questions to the Supreme
Court of Indiana: (1) whether Indi-
ana was a compulsory insurance
state and therefore endorsed a poli-
cy of guaranteeing compensation
to all automobile accident victims,
and (2) whether the household ex-
clusion clause was against the pub-
lic policy of Indiana when applied
to preclude coverage for injuries
similar to those in this case.
Supreme Court of Indiana
Decision
Prior to the enactment of §
9-1-4-3.5, Ind. Code § 9-1-4-3.5
(West Supp. 1990), Indiana was
not a compulsory insurance state;
Indiana required a driver to prove
financial responsibility only after
the driver's first accident. The pri-
or statute provided that a driver
who had passed the "one free
accident" threshold could prove
financial responsibility through
bond, deposit of funds or securi-
ties, and self-insurance. The adop-
tion of § 9-1-4-3.5 changed Indiana
law by requiring proof of financial
responsibility before a car could be
registered. The new statute also
required that such financial re-
sponsibility be maintained
throughout the operation of the
car. Therefore, § 9-1-4-3.5 abolish-
ed the "one free accident" scheme.
The Indiana Supreme Court
characterized Indiana as a "com-
pulsory financial responsibility"
state, but it concluded that the
enactment of § 9-1-4-3.5 did not
evince an intent to guarantee com-
pensation to all automobile acci-
dent victims. Instead, the court
found that the new statute simply
reiterated the state policy of facili-
tating recovery for injuries sus-
tained by individuals other than
those defined as "insureds" under
the insurance policy. Indiana pub-
lic policy favored protection of
automobile drivers and passengers
from injuries inflicted on them by
others. This policy was similarly
applicable under the previous stat-
ute in that drivers were protected
from damages inflicted by another
person's second accident. Thus,
the court concluded that it was
never Indiana policy to protect
insureds from themselves. The
court held that although Indiana
was a compulsory insurance state,
the state's public policy did not
support compensation for all vic-
tims of automobile accidents.
With respect to the second certi-
fied question, the court found that
since 1977, the Indiana courts had
held that a household exclusion
clause in an automobile insurance
policy did not conflict with the
public policy of Indiana. In sup-
port of its position, the court noted
that the legislature had taken no
action to nullify the household
exclusion clause in insurance poli-
cies. The recent enactment of §
9-1-4-3.5 did not interfere with the
agreement of the legislature and
the courts on this issue. Section §
9-1-4-3.5 also did not change the
prior policy of protecting motorists
from drivers other than them-
selves.
Mira Djordjic
Insurance Company
Had No Duty to Notify
Loss Payee of Policy's
Expiration or
Policyholder's Failure to
Renew
In First National Bank of Sioux
City v. Watts, 462 N.W.2d 922
(Iowa 1990), the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that an insurer of an
automobile was under no duty to
notify a loss payee of the automatic
termination of the policy or of the
insured's failure to renew the poli-
cy. Moreover, the court concluded
that the insured's failure to renew
the policy was not an act or neglect
of the owner covered by the loss
payable clause.
Background
Jerome E. Watts ("Watts") pur-
chased a 1987 Pontiac from Bob
Tagatz Pontiac, Inc. ("Tagatz") in
Sioux City, Iowa. Watts and Ta-
gatz entered into a retail sales
installment contract and security
agreement. Tagatz then assigned
(continued on page 106)
Volume 3 Number 3/Spring, 1991 105
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Failure to Renew
(continued from page 105)
the agreement to the First National
Bank of Sioux City ("First Nation-
al").
Subsequently, Watts obtained
automobile insurance from Farm
and City Insurance Company
("Farm and City"). The policy was
effective from October 30, 1986 to
January 30, 1987. The policy could
be renewed for an additional year,
upon payment of the annual pre-
mium on or before January 30,
1987.
Watts listed First National as
loss payee under the loss payable
clause. In pertinent part, the loss
payable clause provided that pay-
ment for a covered loss be made to
the loss payee. In addition, any act
or neglect of the policyholder
would not invalidate the loss pay-
ee's interest. Finally, the clause
required Farm and City to notify
the loss payee of the policy's can-
cellation ten days prior to the
effective cancellation date. As loss
payee, First National received a
copy of the declaration page which
indicated the policy's January 30,
1987 expiration date.
On January 22, 1987, Farm and
City sent Watts a notice of expira-
tion. The notice informed Watts of
the policy's January 30, 1987 expi-
ration date and indicated that
there was no grace period. Watts
failed to make the renewal pay-
ment, and the policy terminated.
Two days later, on February 1,
1987, the vehicle was destroyed in
a collision.
Pursuant to the loss payable
clause, First National wrote to
Farm and City, seeking recovery of
$9,700, the outstanding amount
due under the installment contract.
Farm and City refused to pay First
National because the policy had
expired.
In response to Farm and City's
denial of coverage, First National
contended that it had an insurable
interest in the vehicle. As a third
party beneficiary, First National
claimed that Farm and City was
obligated to notify First National
of the policy's expiration.
Farm and City reiterated that it
had not cancelled the policy but
that the policy had expired. Farm
and City stated that, under the loss
payable clause, it had no duty to
notify First National unless the
policy was cancelled. Also, Farm
and City noted that Iowa law did
not require an insurer to notify an
insured when a policy expired on a
fixed date. Additionally, Iowa law
required insurers to maintain only
liability coverage, not collision
coverage, for ten days after a policy
expired.
In response to Farm and City's
denial of coverage, First National
filed a declaratory judgment action
against Farm and City. First Na-
tional claimed that it was a third
party beneficiary under the loss
payable clause. Second, First Na-
tional argued that it was entitled to
notice of the policy's expiration
and Watts's failure to pay the
renewal premium.
District Court
The district court held that
Farm and City had a duty to notify
First National of the policy's expi-
ration. The court reasoned that
while an insurer need not notify an
insured of a policy's expiration,
First National was not an insured,
but rather a loss payee.
Next, the court examined the
loss payable clause which provided
that an act or omission of the
owner would not affect the loss
payee's rights under the policy.
The court found that the failure of
Watts to pay the renewal premium
was an act or omission contemplat-
ed by the loss payable clause.
Therefore, First National's interest
remained protected in spite of
Watts's failure to pay the renewal
premium.
Lastly, the court noted that the
loss payable clause required Farm
and City to give First National
notice of cancellation. The policy
continued to cover First National,
as Farm and City failed to give the
required notice.
The court entered a judgment in
favor of First National for
$5,873.79, an amount stipulated to
between the parties. Farm and City
appealed the decision.
Iowa Supreme Court
On appeal, the Iowa Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's
decision. Farm and City argued
that Watts's policy was for a speci-
fied period, and therefore, Farm
and City had no duty to notify
First National of the policy's expi-
ration. First National maintained
that Farm and City was required to
notify the bank of the policy's
expiration, emphasizing its special
status as a lienholder.
The court rejected First Nation-
al's argument. The court explained
that, under Iowa law, an insurer is
not required to notify an insured of
a policy's expiration, but only of a
policy's cancellation. If the policy
language included a definite policy
period and the policy terminated at
the end of that period, then the
policy expired. Because Watts's
policy ended on a specified date,
the court found that the policy had
expired; Farm and City, therefore,
did not have to give any notice to
First National.
In addition, the court held that
First National's status as a lien-
holder under the loss payable
clause did not expand Farm and
City's duty to notify First National
in the event of the policy's expira-
tion. In this case, the loss payable
clause required notice to the lien-
holder only in the event that Farm
and City decided to cancel the
policy; the clause was silent with
respect to notification in the event
of the expiration of the policy.
The supreme court rejected the
district court's finding that First
National's interest in the policy
continued because Watts's failure
to renew the policy constituted an
act or omission under the loss
payable clause. The high court
agreed that the loss payable clause
operated as a separate contract
between the insurer and the lien-
holder. However, the court ex-
plained that the reference to "any
act or neglect of the owner" under
the loss payable clause referred to a
breach of a policy condition by the
policyholder. Because the policy
contained no condition requiring
Watts to renew the policy, his
failure to pay a renewal premium
did not constitute a breach of a
policy condition. Therefore, the
court found this portion of the loss
payable clause inapplicable.
The supreme court highlighted
the district court's misunderstand-
ing of the terms 'cancellation' and
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"termination." The court ex-
plained that in insurance law, can-
cellation referred to a termination
of a policy prior to its expiration.
In contrast, termination referred to
the expiration of the policy due to
lapse of the policy period. Since
Watts's policy terminated due to
the lapse of the policy period, the
court determined that notice under
the loss payable clause was not
required.
Although Farm and City offered
to renew Watts's policy, the court
explained that the offer did not
affect its decision. By its terms, the
policy automatically terminated
upon Watts's failure to pay the
renewal premium. Indeed, the ter-
mination signaled a rejection of the
offer.
Finally, the supreme court re-
jected First National's public poli-
cy argument that an insurer had an
inherent duty to give notice of the
expiration to a loss payee. The
court recognized that no known
authority required an insurance
company to continue to contract
with an insured after the policy
expired. Also, the court empha-
sized that because First National
had a copy of the declaration page,
it was fully aware of the expiration
date. The court concluded that in
the absence of an insurance policy
or statutory provision stating oth-
erwise, an insurer had no duty to
notify a lienholder of a policyhold-
er's failure to renew or of the
expiration of the policy period.
The court reversed and remand-
ed the case, directing that judg-
ment be entered in favor of Farm
and City.
Elizabeth A. Barnes
Iowa Supreme Court
Denied Right of First
Refusal To Agricultural
Property Mortgagors
In Cole v. First Bank of Greene,
463 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1990), the
Iowa Supreme Court held that a
bank was not required to offer the
prior owners of foreclosed agricul-
tural property the opportunity to
repurchase the property. In addi-
tion, the court held that the prior
owners failed to establish the exis-
tence of an oral contract with the
bank which would have permitted
the prior owners to purchase a
portion of the foreclosed property
at a reduced price.
Background
Dean and Marilyn Cole (the
"Coles") borrowed money from
the First Bank of Greene ("First
Bank") and used their eighty-three
acre farm as collateral. When the
Coles failed to repay the loans,
First Bank obtained a decree of
foreclosure on the Coles' farm in
November 1986. Pursuant to an
order by the district court, the
county sheriff placed a levy on the
property. In December 1986, the
Coles filed a designation of home-
stead, which exempted their resi-
dence and up to forty acres of their
property from creditors' liens.
In January 1987, First Bank bid
$80,000 for the property at a sher-
iff's sale. First Bank received a
certificate of sheriff's sale which
entitled it to receive within one
year either the balance of the debt
owed by the Coles or the title to
their farm. First Bank immediately
assigned the certificate to Leon D.
Steere and C. Jolene Steere (the
"Steeres") for $70,000; First Bank
did not first offer the Coles the
opportunity to repurchase the
property on the same terms.
Seven months later, the Coles
filed an application in the foreclo-
sure action, asking the court to
determine the fair market value of
the homestead property. The court
did not act on this application.
The Coles filed suit in 1988
against First Bank and the Steeres.
First, the Coles claimed that the
district court's failure to determine
the fair market value of the home-
stead in the foreclosure action de-
nied them their right to redeem
their property. Iowa Code § 654.16
(1987). Second, the Coles alleged
that First Bank denied them their
right of first refusal by failing to
offer them the sheriff's certificate
at the same price that the Steeres
paid. Iowa Code § 524.910(2)
(1 987). Finally, the Coles contend-
ed that First Bank breached an oral
agreement it had made in which it
agreed to resell the Coles six acres
of their property if First Bank was
the highest bidder at the foreclo-
sure sale.
On all three issues, the Iowa
district court decided in favor of
First Bank. The Coles appealed.
Supreme Court's Decision
Right to Fair Market Valuation of
Homestead
On appeal, the Coles argued that
the district court erred in refusing
to determine the fair market value
of their homestead according to §
654.16. Iowa Code § 654.16
(1987). In 1986, the Iowa Legisla-
ture adopted § 654.16 which pro-
vided that a mortgagor could desig-
nate a portion of the foreclosed
land as a homestead. The statute
also stated that a court would
determine the fair market value of
the homestead, in the event it was
sold with nonhomestead property;
the mortgagor was permitted to
redeem the homestead separately
within two years of the foreclosure
sale. In 1987, the Iowa Legislature
amended § 654.16, revising the
valuation procedures for agricul-
tural homesteads subject to re-
demption.
The court rejected the Coles'
argument. The court noted that the
Coles had conceded in their post-
trial brief that § 654.16 did not
apply to them due to its enactment
date. In this case, the sheriff's sale
took place prior to the effective
date of the 1987 revisions to §
654.16. The court held that
through their earlier concession
regarding § 654.16, the Coles
waived their right to raise the issue
on appeal.
Right of First Refusal
Second, the Coles asserted that
under § 524.910(2), Iowa Code §
524.910(2) (1987), First Bank was
required first to offer the fore-
closed property to them on the
same terms as proposed to the
Steeres. Section 524.910(2) re-
quired a state bank to dispose of
real property purchased in a fore-
closure sale within five years after
the title vested in the bank. The
statute also provided that if the
real property was agricultural land,
prior to selling the land to another
person, the bank must offer the
prior owner the opportunity to
(continued on page 108)
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